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ABSTRACT 
We model the evacuation of vehicles in a residential neighborhood using a space-time 
network flow representation.  Our model solves for “best case” evacuation routes and 
clearing times, as could be identified and implemented by a central authority.  Our 
models are large but can be solved efficiently and quickly.  By solving many model 
excursions for different input parameters, we can assess the importance of different 
model features, as well as evaluate evacuation behavior for a variety of what-if scenarios.  
We apply this model to the Mission Canyon neighborhood near Santa Barbara, 
California, and contrast our results to a previous simulation-based study. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
We model the evacuation of vehicles in a residential neighborhood using a space-time 
network flow representation.  Our model solves for “best case” evacuation routes and 
clearing times, as could be identified and implemented by a central authority.  Our 
models are large but can be solved efficiently and quickly.  By solving many model 
excursions for different input parameters, we can assess the importance of different 
model features as well as evaluate evacuation behavior for a variety of what-if scenarios.  
We apply this model to the Mission Canyon neighborhood near Santa Barbara, 
California, and contrast our results to a previous simulation-based study. 
We develop two network flow models to quantify the clearing times of 
neighborhood evacuations.  Our first model is a spatial model that finds minimum cost 
evacuation routes.  We represent the Mission Canyon neighborhood as a network 
consisting of supply (e.g., homes), transshipment nodes (e.g., intersections), and 
connecting arcs (e.g., road segments), all of which are connected to a “super-sink” egress 
point.  From this spatial model, we create a space-time model by replicating the spatial 
network for each of T time periods, and we solve for best case evacuation flows in space 
and time. 
We first develop a baseline evacuation scenario of Mission Canyon and compare 
it to the previous analysis of Church and Sexton (2002).  We find that our model 
produces similar evacuation clearance time estimates as those obtained by the more time 
intensive micro-simulations.  With this baseline established, we exercise the model to 
assess the effects that various changes to our model inputs or network design have on 
neighborhood evacuation time.  Because our model is simple and solves quickly, we are 
able to consider several scenarios. 
We find that staggering the departure times of evacuees does not result in an 
appreciably longer clearing time than an evacuation with simultaneous departures.  We 
conclude that the presence of background traffic flow on a major evacuation road with 
non-evacuation traffic does not greatly impact the neighborhood evacuation, but rather 
 xiv
that the overall evacuation time is more largely impacted by the interior roads of the 
neighborhood.  We estimate that losing access to one particular evacuation road would 
more than double the time to evacuate the neighborhood for both a one- and two-car-per-
household scenario.  This crippling effect results when an intersection node at either end 
of this road segment is blocked, and we argue that efforts should be taken to ensure this 
road is fortified against possible closure due to natural or deliberate attacks. 
We ran analyses on our network to determine the effects on evacuation time if any 
of 21 “critical intersections” are either isolated from the network or have their throughput 
capacity severely limited.  Of the 21 intersections, we find that eight of them would 
isolate some number of houses from the network if we completely disconnect them.  
Similarly, we find that complete isolation of 13 of the 21 intersections results in longer 
evacuations.  The least severe of these increases evacuation time by 50 seconds (0:50), 
while the most severe closure increases clearing time by 45:00. 
We examine the results on neighborhood clearing time if each of these same 21 
intersections has their throughput capacity limited to one vehicle per time period (360 per 
hour).  These analyses show that 14 of the 21 intersections would have no impact on 
overall clearance times if restricted.  For the other seven, the least severe delay was 0:10, 
while the most severe increased evacuation times by 22:10. 
There are many natural extensions to this work, including modifying the network 
to allow for additional routes and estimating evacuation times under these conditions.  
Similarly, we can add an additional exit point to the network to estimate how evacuation 
times are affected.  
 xv
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I. INTRODUCTION  
During a disaster, either natural (e.g., wildfires, hurricanes) or man-made (e.g., 
terrorist attacks), the ability to evacuate an at-risk population can literally be the 
difference between life and death.  In 1991, 25 people died when the Oakland Hills 
neighborhood of California caught fire, spreading rapidly through the neighborhood with 
the assistance of strong winds (Church & Sexton, 2002).  The loss of life during this fire 
led to an increased interest in neighborhood evacuation modeling, as concerned 
communities sought to improve their evacuation plans. 
The goal of evacuation modeling is to determine whether a given area can be 
evacuated in the event of a disaster, and how long it would take.  Determining evacuation 
times is not an easy task to achieve, as the conditions present during an evacuation do not 
exist under normal circumstances.  Unusually large volumes of evacuees on a given 
route, as well as a heightened emotional state caused by the emergency, are some 
examples of conditions that are unique to an evacuation scenario.  While some of these 
conditions may be difficult to predict accurately beforehand, we understand that the 
traffic demand on neighborhood evacuation routes depends on the number of vehicles in 
a given area in the time preceding an evacuation.  We use this notion of “supply” and 
“demand” to develop an understanding of evacuation dynamics. 
There is no shortage of methods relied upon to inform decision makers about the 
dynamics of an evacuation.  These methods range from live simulations such as fire drills 
at schools to more computationally oriented solutions, including computer simulations 
and physics-based models that attempt to describe the movement of people during an 
evacuation in terms of fluid flows.  Simulations range in scope from large-scale 
evacuations that attempt to answer how long it takes to evacuate an entire city to smaller-
scale “micro” simulations that focus on individual actors and their behavior during an 
evacuation event.  These micro simulations attempt to represent real-world behaviors of 
individuals or vehicles as they navigate through an evacuation area; the results highlight 
areas or situations that could hinder an evacuation process.  While informative, these 
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simulations require considerable time and effort to set up properly, and the required level 
of programming to implement and test changes to the system can make it prohibitive to 
respond to emergent threat scenarios. 
In this thesis, we develop a network flow model of an evacuation scenario and use 
optimization to quantify best-case evacuation behavior; we focus on the evacuation of the 
Mission Canyon neighborhood near Santa Barbara, California.  We have chosen this 
neighborhood for several reasons.  First, its location along an urban-wildland boundary 
combined with the history of wildfires in the adjacent Los Padres National Forest makes 
it a high-risk area for fires.  Second, previous work by Cova and Church (1997) 
determined that the Mission Canyon neighborhood has a “high bulk-lane demand.”  
Defined as the total demand leaving a neighborhood compared to the number of lanes 
that leave the neighborhood, a high bulk-lane demand area that indicates quick 
evacuation may be difficult.  Because this neighborhood is at-risk, Church and Sexton 
(2002) directed considerable effort to develop a micro simulation model of its evacuation; 
we believe this micro simulation model provides an excellent baseline against which to 
compare the results of our network flow model.  While we do not assert that our model 
captures all the details in the micro simulation model, we believe that it captures the first-
order evacuation behavior, such as congestion “hot spots” that could delay evacuation.  
We maintain that understanding this first-order behavior is critical for planning 
evacuations.  Because we can quickly modify and solve the network flow model if 
conditions change (e.g., one road used for evacuation becomes blocked and cannot be 
used) it can be an important tool for emergency planners. 
Chapter II of this thesis reviews previous attempts to model evacuation.  In 
Chapter III, we present in detail our network flow model of evacuation.  Chapter IV 
presents our analysis of the Mission Canyon neighborhood, and how the results compare 
to the previous micro simulation work.  In Chapter V, we present our conclusions 
concerning the efficacy of our model, along with potential follow on work to improve the 
model.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Evacuation modeling has progressed from what essentially amounted to “best-
guess estimates” into a wide and mature discipline.  The level of detail of research has 
varied between large-scale city or county evacuations to small-scale building 
evacuations.  This section briefly reviews some of the research most relevant to this 
study. 
A. LARGE-SCALE EVACUATIONS 
Evacuation research starts with the notion that an evacuation can be successful 
only when there is sufficient time for all affected individuals to reach safety.  Building on 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Hurricane Evacuation (HURREVAC) 
system (FEMA, 2000) for determining an evacuation radius in the event of a hurricane, 
Cova et al. (2005) argue that a similar system can be developed for fires or other smaller 
scale evacuations.  Taking wind speed, available fuel, ground gradient, and other 
pertinent information as input, they develop a model that identifies “decision arcs” that 
can help emergency planners determine when an evacuation should be ordered, or when 
people should be told not to evacuate because the fire is too close.  Using simulation, the 
authors are able to identify decision arcs that are not necessarily equidistant or uniform 
(as would be the case for hurricanes), and can be changed depending upon the varying 
input conditions.  Their work informs our research by demonstrating the ability to model 
a complex evacuation decision process in a dynamic environment (Cova et al., 2005). 
Li and Zhang (2009) assess whether an evacuation is feasible with a stochastic 
Markov process simulation of evacuee movement within a network as they travel from 
their origin to the designated “safe zone.”  Each network node has an initial population 
and number of evacuation vehicles, and the simulation provides an expected distribution 
of evacuees over time.  The authors conclude that their model informs decision makers 
about the adequacy of the transportation network to support an evacuation. 
Lahmar et al. (2006) use a staged optimization process to determine optimal 
routes out of an evacuation zone.  Using input from the Geographical Information System 
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(GIS), they consider a geographic region that encompasses the evacuation zone along 
with safe destinations that can be reached from this area.  The authors divide up the 
evacuation zone by zip codes, and they estimate the population in each zip code as the 
product of the houses in the zip code and the average number of people per house. They 
place a node at the geographic center of each zip code, and use the associated population 
for that zip code as the supply at the node.  Arcs represent all roads that connect one node 
to another, and they model safe regions as destination nodes.  Arc costs for their model 
are the associated distance between nodes.  By solving for the maximum passage of 
people during a specified time window, they determine whether it is feasible for a central 
authority to evacuate the total population.  They argue that this method produces a lower 
bound on the amount of time needed to evacuate a given area, and that it helps to 
determine if the network is capable of supporting an evacuation if ordered. 
B. SMALL SCALE EVACUATIONS 
At the opposite end of the scale is the evacuation of relatively small areas, such as 
buildings or city blocks.  Here, one typically assumes that evacuation is feasible, and the 
question is simply how long it will take. 
Chalmet, Francis, and Saunders (1982) develop a network flow model of building 
evacuation.  They take as inputs to the model: the number of people in the workspaces, 
the flow capacity of stairwells, halls, and lobbies, and the static capacity of all these 
areas.  Using this information, they first built a static model of the building and then 
extend that model to account for time.  They achieve this by duplicating each node in the 
static model once for each distinct time period and creating arcs that represent the 
movement of individuals in space and time.  They use time-dependent arc costs along the 
exit-to-super-sink arcs, and solve for minimum cost flows to obtain minimum evacuation 
times.  The output of their model presents optimum evacuation times and optimal route 
utilization (Chalmet et al., 1982). 
Fahy (1995) also models building evacuation using a network; in this model, 
rooms and exits are nodes while hallways and stairwells are arcs.  Starting with occupant 
data for each room and walking speeds of individuals, one solves the network flow model 
 5
to determine the movements and clearance times during an evacuation.  By allowing the 
modeler to choose between the shortest routes or most familiar routes of evacuees, this 
model can represent both exit behaviors, and it shows as output such metrics as floor 
clearing times and how many people use each exit (Fahy, 1995). 
Chiu and Zheng (2007) also use a time-step network flow model.  Building on the 
cell transmission model of Daganzo (1994, 1995), the authors represent evacuation 
behavior as movement along the arcs that can be traveled by unimpeded traffic in one 
time period.  They specify four different types of cells, each with a different equation that 
describes travel between those cells.  They take as input the number of evacuating people 
from a region, as well as the region itself.  They treat each of the applicable border nodes 
of the “hot zone” as a viable destination node, and they connect all of these nodes to an 
artificial sink node.  In addition, they link all source nodes to an artificial source node.  
The resulting optimization identifies the number of time steps (and therefore the 
evacuation time) necessary to evacuate groups of different priorities, as well as the 
optimal routes that should be taken. 
Liu et al. (2006) also build upon the work of Daganzo (1994, 1995).  They 
develop a two-level integrated optimization, and perform follow-on simulation to 
compare their results.  Using a modified cell transmission model consisting of general 
cells, source cells, and sink cells (each with different flow equations), their high-level 
optimization seeks to maximize vehicle throughput, while their low-level optimization 
seeks to minimize travel and waiting time for the evacuation.  They report these attributes 
as outputs for the model, in addition to the routes that are used in the low-level 
optimization.  The results, when compared to simulation, indicate that their approach is 
capable of effectively and efficiently generating a set of optimal emergency evacuation 
plans.  This research builds on previous research by Liu et al. (2005), which seeks to 
develop a general framework for an emergency evacuation system. 
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C. OUR CONTRIBUTION IN CONTEXT 
We model the evacuation of the Mission Canyon neighborhood using a space-
time network flow representation, similar in concept to that of Chalmet et al. (1982) but 
for the entire neighborhood.  Our model solves for “best case” evacuation routes and 
clearing times, as could be identified and implemented by a central authority.  Our 
models are large, but we can solve them efficiently and quickly.  By solving many model 
excursions, we can assess the importance of different model features as well as evaluate 
evacuation behavior for a variety of what-if scenarios.  We apply our model to the 
evacuation of the Mission Canyon neighborhood and compare our results to the 
simulation-based study of Church and Sexton (2002). 
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III. MODEL FORMULATION 
A. THE SPATIAL MODEL 
We model the neighborhood evacuation as a single-commodity network flow 
optimization problem.  We believe that modeling the problem in such a manner is 
comparably informative to the much more time intensive micro-simulation approaches 
often used to assess evacuation behavior.  We use the Mission Canyon Neighborhood of 
Santa Barbara as our test neighborhood for two specific reasons.  First, its proximity to 
large wooded areas and its limited number of egress routes make it a likely candidate to 
need rapid evacuation during wildfire emergencies.  Second, Church and Sexton (2002) 
already modeled this neighborhood using a micro-scale traffic simulation model; the 
results of this prior micro-simulation provide a baseline against which we can measure 
the results we obtain.  A picture of the neighborhood from that report appears in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1.   Mission Canyon neighborhood (From Church & Sexton, 2002).  The picture 
shows the street network as well as the two egress points to the exit zone. 
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We use Google Earth to map out the road network.  We segment the 
neighborhood roads into a series of arcs and nodes, separating long road segments into a 
series of arcs and “transshipment nodes” at intervals of approximately 264 feet (0.05 
miles) apart.  We represent each node with a placement marker available in the Google 
Earth software package.  The markers allow us to individually label each node, and 
provide coordinate data that we use in displaying the network and running our 
optimization model.  We then place nodes on the map overlay corresponding to the 
location of the houses (source nodes) within the neighborhood.  We connect each house 
node to the closest corresponding node on the road network.  We connect each house 
node to its adjacent road node using a single directed arc, and we connect adjacent road 
nodes using two directed arcs, one for each possible direction of travel along that road 
segment.  We treat the points of egress in the neighborhood as the destination nodes for 
all traffic flow; if there is more than one egress we connect these nodes to a “super sink” 
node that has a demand equal to the sum total of all traffic in the region of interest.  
















Figure 2.   A simple neighborhood and its spatial network representation. 
 9
We modify the preliminary network by dividing it into regions and creating 
special intersection nodes.  We split the Mission Canyon neighborhood into five distinct 
regions to help us visualize and quantify the flow dynamics through the neighborhood.  
We split each road intersection node into an inbound and outbound node connected by a 
single directed arc.  This allows us to constrain the flow through intersections, as the 
intersections are likely to be bottlenecks during an evacuation event.  Using the Google 
Earth picture as a guide, we next develop a list of nodes in the network and list of arcs 
connecting these nodes.  The resulting data files are consistent with a forward-star matrix 
often used in network flow problems (Ahuja, Magnanti, & Orlin, 1993, p. 35).   
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The objective function value for our mathematical formulation (C0) aims to 
minimize the total cost of moving all supplies to a sink.  Constraint (C1) ensures balance 
of flow at each node.  Constraint (C2) ensures that flow along an arc does not exceed the 
capacity for that arc.  Constraint (C3) ensures that there are no negative flows. 
B. THE SPACE-TIME MODEL 
Building on our spatial model, we develop a space-time model that replicates our 
spatial network in each of T time periods, and optimize the neighborhood evacuation 
based on time dependent arc costs assigned to those arcs that connect our egress points to 
our super-sink node.  We incentivize movement by assigning a small cost to those arcs 
that represent remaining stationary in space-time, and assign zero arc costs to all other 
arcs throughout the network.  The approach is as follows:  For each time period t, we 
create an exact copy of all nodes in the network.  We connect neighboring nodes from the 
spatial network with arcs that traverse a single time period (e.g., from t to t+1).  In this 
network no supply ever remains stationary at one node.  Although in actuality a vehicle 
may remain stationary between time periods t and t+1, they are moving through “space-
time.”  In other words, a car at node n that is stationary would move from node n at time t 
to node n at time t+1 in our model.  By imposing an upper capacity limit on these 
“horizontal arcs,” we define a maximum amount of vehicles that can be held over at one 
node between time periods; if the inbound flow to a node exceeds its outbound arc 
capacity and its holding capacity, it forces that inbound flow to backup elsewhere in the 
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network.  This structure allows us to model the buildup of traffic along a road segment 





















































Figure 3.   A simple spatial network and its representation in the space-time network. 
 




i L        Locations (alias j) 
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 ,  i t N      Nodes N=L x T   
 , , ,i t j tp A      Arc from (i ,t) to (j, tp) 
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( , )i t S      Sink Flows from location i in time t 
Data 
,i tbb       Supply at node i at time t 
, , ,i t j tpuu      Upper limit on arc ( , , , )i t j tp  
, , ,i t j tpcc       Per-unit cost on arc  , , ,i t j tp  
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In the above formulation, the objective function (Q0) is an intermediate 
calculation we use to determine the minimum evacuation time for the Mission Canyon 
neighborhood.  The first term represents the cost of flow movement through the space-
time network, and the second term is a weighted sum of sink flows.  For our model, we 
assign an arc cost of zero to all movement arcs in the actual network that do not flow into 
the sink.  We assign a minimal cost to arcs that represent remaining stationary to incent 
movement throughout the network.  Additional costs are incurred when flow passes out 
of the real network into our artificial sink node.  For simplicity, we assign to these arcs a 
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cost that increases with the time period in which the flow occurs (i.e., one unit of flow to 
the sink node at t=3 incurs a cost of three, while one unit of flow at t=4 incurs a cost of 
four, etc.).  Minimizing this objective means getting all flows to the sink as soon as 
possible.  The objective function value itself does not tell us much about minimum time 
to evacuate; however, we can recover clearing time by looking at sink flows. 
 The first three constraints are balance of flow constraints.  Constraint (Q1a) 
ensures that the initial supply at a node plus any incoming supply at that node for time 
period t is equal to the supply remaining plus any flow from that node at time t+1; this 
constraint does not address the first and last time period.  Constraint (Q1b) is the balance 
of flow constraint for the first time period, t=0.  This constraint ensures that all supply 
initially present at a node (i) in time period t=0 is accounted for as flow to other nodes (j) 
at t=1.  Constraint (Q1c) ensures that we account for all available supply by the final time 
period t=T. 
 Constraint (Q2) is a capacity constraint on the arcs in the network; it ensures that 
we do not have a greater volume of flow on any particular arc than the maximum 
capacity of that arc.  Constraint (Q3) is a non-negativity constraint and ensures that there 
are no negative flows. 
C. THE MISSION CANYON EXAMPLE 
We apply model SPACETIME to the Mission Canyon neighborhood.  We use a 
time step interval of 10 seconds, which is the approximate time it takes for an unimpeded 
car to travel over an arc segment of length 264 feet (0.05 miles).  We base this interval on 
a maximum sustainable speed through the neighborhood of approximately 22 miles per 
hour (Church, 2010), which corresponds to approximately 3 minutes to travel a mile.  
Furthermore, we assume arc capacities of five vehicles for all transshipment nodes within 
our network.  We base this arc capacity on an average vehicle length of approximately 17 
feet, and assuming that an average vehicle will take up approximately 50 feet of road, 
including spacing between vehicles.  Essentially, all of the roads in Mission Canyon are 
two-lane roads, and we do not attempt to model either contraflow scenarios or traffic 
control scenarios.  In addition to being able to support five vehicles traveling along an 
arc, we assign a “holding capacity” of five vehicles per node, which translates to 
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horizontal arc capacities of five vehicles.  We assign varying capacities to the different 
intersection arcs based on their traffic throughput capacities (Church, 2010), and we 
designate two distinct nodes in our network as sink nodes; our designation corresponds to 
the intersection Church and Sexton (2002) identified as being exit points for the 
















Figure 4.   The Mission Canyon neighborhood with intersections and sink nodes 
identified.  (After Church & Sexton, 2002). 
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1. Ben Lomond and Williams BEN01 1000 2.8 3
2. Kenmore and Ben Lomond BEN06 750 2.1 2
3. Cheltenham and Dorking (North) CHEL01 750 2.1 2
4. Cheltenham and Dorking (South) CHEL03 750 2.1 2
5. Kenmore and Cheltenham CHEL06 750 2.1 2
6. Cheltenham and Exeter(North) CHEL12 750 2.1 2
7. Cheltenham and Selwyn CHEl13 750 2.1 2
8. Cheltenham and Glen Albyn CHEL16 750 2.1 2
9. Cheltenham and Tye CHEL17 900 2.5 3
10. Cheltenham and Exeter(South) CHEL18 750 2.1 2
11. Windsor and Cheltenham CHEL23 750 2.1 2
12. Cheltenham and Foothill CHEL24 1250 3.5 4
13. Exeter and Exeter Place EX02 1000 2.8 3
14. Tunnel and Mission FOO01 1200 3.3 4
15. Glen Albyn and Foothill Gle07in 1200 3.3 4
16. Kenmore and Arriba KEN04 750 2.1 2
17. Montrose and Cheltenham MONTROSE01 1000 2.8 3
18. Williams and Palomino PALOMINO16 850 2.4 3
19. Montrose and Tunnel TUNNEL24 850 2.4 3
20. Tye and Foothill TYE01 1200 3.3 4
21. Williams and Cheltenham WILLIAMS03 1000 2.8 3
* Church (2010)  
Table 1.   Critical intersections of the Mission Canyon neighborhood.  Using the 
estimated throughput capacities (in hourly vehicle flow) from Church (2010), we 
obtain an assumed flow capacity per time period (10-second interval).  We use 
integer throughput for our model because it produces integer results (due to 
unimodularity).  Our model is robust enough that throughputs could be non-
integer data, with the understanding that the output would need to be interpreted 







































Figure 5.   Network Representation of the Mission Canyon neighborhood with each of 






A. DETERMINING A BASELINE 
We first consider the scenario in which one car per household needs to evacuate 
from the Mission Canyon neighborhood.  To be consistent with the previous work done 
by Church and Sexton (2002), we assume that 30% of all evacuating vehicles leave at 
t=1, 50% of vehicles begin to evacuate after five minutes (t=30), and 20% of vehicles 
begin to evacuate after 10 minutes (t=60).  Under this scenario, it takes 18 minutes and 10 
seconds (denoted as 18:10) for all vehicles to completely evacuate the neighborhood.  
Figure 6 shows the cumulative number of vehicles that evacuate through each of the sink 












































































Figure 7.   Vehicle clearing times and distribution by region (one vehicle per driveway).  
The shaded portion of the graph shows the number of vehicles in each region 
as a function of time.  Note that a vehicle leaving one region may have to 
enter another region before exiting the neighborhood (e.g., vehicles leaving 
Region 1 must enter Region 4 before exiting). 
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We next consider the scenario in which two vehicles per household must evacuate 
the neighborhood, all of which follow the same staggered departures as with the one car 
scenario.  We find that doubling the number of vehicles nearly double the clearing time; 
for two vehicles per household it takes 33:10 to completely evacuate the neighborhood.  
Figure 8 shows the cumulative evacuations through each of the sink nodes.  Figure 9 























































Figure 9.   Vehicle clearing times and distribution by region (two vehicle per driveway). 
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We observe that the clearance times obtained from our network-flow model are 
consistent with the results from the micro-simulation model of Church and Sexton 
(2002).  Assuming one car per driveway, they estimate that it takes 18:49 for all vehicles 
to evacuate, our model estimates that 18:50 would be required.  Similarly, their model 
estimates that it would take 34:50 to evacuate all vehicles under a two car per driveway 
scenario, while our optimization model estimates a total time of 33:10 to evacuate the 
vehicles.  Considering the level of agreement between the predicted clearance times these 
two models produce, we consider our optimization model to be valid, relative to their 
simulation model.  Table 2 presents full results and a comparison to the Church and 
Sexton (2002) micro-simulation model, referred to as the “Vital Report.” 
1 car/house 2 cars/house 1 car/house 2 car/house 1 car/house 2 car/house 1 car/house 2 car/house 1 car/house 2 car/house
total cars 763 1526 766 1532 766 1532 766 1532 766 1532
% of cars 50% 8:23 15:43 9:40 14:50 8:30 11:40 7:40 14:40 6:00 10:30
75% 12:04 24:16 13:10 21:50 12:30 20:00 11:30 21:50 11:30 19:50
90% 15:28 30:25 15:50 27:40 16:00 27:40 15:20 27:30 15:20 27:30
95% 16:44 32:40 17:10 30:10 17:10 30:20 16:40 30:00 16:40 30:10
100% 18:49 34:58 18:50 33:10 18:50 33:10 18:10 33:00 18:10 33:00
# of cars 200 4:57 4:43 6:20 4:20 6:00 3:50 4:20 4:10 3:20 3:00
400 9:14 8:47 10:00 8:00 8:50 7:00 8:00 8:00 6:20 5:20
600 13:41 12:59 13:40 11:40 13:10 9:30 12:20 11:40 12:20 8:00
800 16:55 15:20 12:10 15:20 11:00
1000 21:54 19:10 15:10 19:00 15:00
1200 26:53 22:50 21:40 22:40 21:40
1400 32:45 28:20 28:20 28:10 28:20
Vital Report SPACETIME SPACETIME SPACETIME SPACETIME
Staggered Staggered No Stagger No stagger
Foothill flow =5 Foothill flow =10 Foothill flow =5 Foothill flow =10
 
Table 2.   Comparison of clearance times for the Vital Report and for the staggered 
and simultaneous departure scenarios of our model. 
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B. DOES STAGGERING MATTER? 
Having established a baseline for our evacuation model, we now ask how much of 
an impact the assumed staggered departures have on the total time to evacuate the 
neighborhood.  To determine whether there is an effect, we modify our model so that all 
vehicles begin to evacuate at t=1.  Under this scenario, our model estimates a clearing 
time of 18:10 to evacuate the neighborhood assuming one car per driveway, compared to 
18:50 if we stagger the departure times.  The results for two cars per household assuming 
a simultaneous evacuation indicate a clearing time of 33:00, compared to 33:10 if we 
stagger the departure time.   
These results suggest that staggering the departure times has essentially no impact 
on the total time to evacuate the neighborhood.  This implies that the road network is near 
its limit for clearing capacity in either scenario.  Figure 10 shows the number of cars in 
each of the five regions, for the one-car-per-house scenario during a staggered 
evacuation, and during a simultaneous evacuation.  Figure 11 shows the number of cars 
in each of the five regions, for the two-car-per-house scenario, during a staggered 



























































Figure 10.   Clearing times by region, staggered departures (top), simultaneous departures 





































































Figure 11.   Clearing times by region, staggered departure (top), simultaneous departure 
(bottom).  Note that the staggered departure case repeats Figure 9. 
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C. THE IMPORTANCE OF FOOTHILL ROAD 
1. Reduction in Throughput Capacity 
We next consider whether or not the presence of “background” traffic along 
Foothill Road has an effect on the total amount of time it takes to evacuate the Mission 
Canyon neighborhood.  All neighborhood traffic must travel on Foothill Road in order to 
evacuate the neighborhood, but there can also be significant traffic on it from surrounding 
neighborhoods.  Thus, there is potential for existing traffic to impede the evacuation.  We 
consider this by running a number of model excursions in which we vary the capacity of 
the arcs that coincide with Foothill Road.  We focus these experiments on the two car 
staggered baseline scenario, since we believe that any potential problems with evacuation 






arc capacity=1 2:08:40 1:35:30
arc capacity=2 1:05:10 32:00
arc capacity=3 43:50 10:40
arc capacity=4 33:10 -
arc capacity=5 33:10 -
arc capacity=10 33:10 -
arc capacity=15 33:10 -
arc capacity=50 33:10 -
Loss of Foothill/Mission egress 1:04:30 31:20
Loss of Foothill/Alamar egress 51:40 18:30  
Table 3.   Results of varying vehicle capacity and egress routes along Foothill Road. 
Table 3 summarizes the results.  We find that as long as there is capacity of four 
vehicles per time period (1440 per hour), then there is no impact on clearing times.  
Recall that our baseline assumes five vehicles per time period. 
Decreases below four vehicles per time period on Foothill Road affect the 
clearing times for Mission Canyon.  If the arc capacity is only one vehicle per time period 
(360 per hour), it takes 2:08:40 to evacuate the neighborhood, or 1:35:30 longer than our 
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baseline scenario.  An arc capacity of two vehicles per time period (720 per hour) 
requires an additional 32:00 over the baseline to clear the neighborhood, while an arc 
capacity of three vehicles per time period (1080 per hour) requires an additional 10:40 to 
clear.  Increases in capacity above the baseline (up to 50 cars per time period) yield no 
improvement in clearing times. 
Like the other roads in Mission Canyon, Foothill Road is a two-lane road; 
however, this road can support vehicles at higher speeds and has a higher speed limit.  
Based on posted speed limits, we conservatively estimate that Foothill Road has a 
capacity of eight vehicles per time period (2880 vehicles per hour).  Thus, as long as 
there is approximately 50% of free-flow capacity (1400 vehicles per hour) on Foothill 
Road during an evacuation, the presence of background traffic does not impact the 
clearing time of the Mission Canyon neighborhood; rather, it is the road network of the 
neighborhood itself that is the limiting factor during an evacuation.  There are a number 
of intersections in the Mission Canyon neighborhood that have a low throughput 
capacity, and many of these fall along the main routes out of the neighborhood.  These 
restrictive intersections have a greater impact on how long it takes to evacuate the 
neighborhood than the presence of traffic on Foothill Road.   
2. Loss of an Egress Point 
We also consider the impact of losing an egress point by changing the quantity of 
sink nodes and estimating how much longer it will take to evacuate the neighborhood.  
By removing the Foothill Road and Mission Canyon Drive intersection as a point of 
egress, it takes 64:30 to evacuate, an increase of 31:20 over our baseline scenario.  
Removing the Foothill Road and Alamar Avenue intersection as a point of egress it takes 
51:40 to evacuate Mission Canyon, an increase of 18:30 minutes from our baseline 
scenario.  These results also appear in Table 3.   
D. IMPACT OF ROAD OR INTERSECTION CLOSURES 
We now consider the impact of closing roads and intersections in the Mission 
Canyon neighborhood on evacuation behavior. 
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1. Varying the Flow Along Tunnel Road 
Tunnel Road runs along the side of the lower Mission Canyon neighborhood, 
serving as the single egress route for the upper portion of the neighborhood, and one of 
two main egress routes for the middle portion of the neighborhood.  We consider what 
impact closing the lower portion of the road (below the point of entry for middle Mission 
Canyon) would have on the overall evacuation time.  To assess this, we set the arc 
capacity of the segment connecting Tunnel Road to Foothill Road (Tunnel33 in our 
model) to zero.  For the one car scenario, the closure of this arc results in a clearing time 
of 41:10, or 22:20 longer than our baseline model.  In fact, losing this egress route results 
in a longer clearing time than what would be required for the two-car scenario if the arc 
remained open and at its baseline capacity.  Closing this arc in our two-car scenarios 
results in a clearance time of 1:18:10, or 45 minutes longer than the time required for our 
baseline model. 
We also consider the effect of closing Tunnel Road near the point of entry for 
middle Mission Canyon (Tunnel24 in our model).  Doing so results in clearing times that 
are nearly identical to those we obtain by closing the road near the entry to Foothill Road.  
These results clearly indicate that this segment of road is crucial to a quick evacuation of 
the Mission Canyon neighborhood.  Figure 12 shows the location of Tunnel Road, as well 






Figure 12.   The Mission Canyon Neighborhood with lower Tunnel Road highlighted  
(After Church & Sexton, 2002). 
Because of the importance of this road on the evacuation of the Mission Canyon 
neighborhood, we now consider how the evacuation would change if we could somehow 
increase the carrying capacity of this segment of the network.  For example, we could 
increase the carrying capacity of this road segment, if we use both lanes of the road for 
egress; this is known as contraflow traffic control.  We study this by increasing the 
carrying capacity for all arcs along this segment of road from five cars per time period 
(our baseline) to ten cars per time period.  For both the one- and two-car scenarios, this 
change yields no estimated improvement in clearing time of the Mission Canyon 
neighborhood, due to a limiting effect that Foothill Road now has on the network.  
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However, by also increasing the arc capacity along Foothill Road to ten cars per time 
period, we do see some improvement in clearing times.  The one car scenario sees only a 
modest 0:30 improvement in clearing times when we model for contraflow along Tunnel 
and increased flow along Foothill Road.  The two-car scenario sees a more significant 
improvement in evacuation times, however, decreasing from 33:10 to 26:30, lowering the 
evacuation time by 6:40 minutes.  Based on this, we believe that the evacuation of 
Mission Canyon could be improved by utilizing a combination of contraflow traffic 
routing along Tunnel Road and limiting the non-evacuation traffic along Foothill Road, 
thereby allowing for greater evacuation traffic flow.  We present full results for these 
model excursions in Table 4 and Table 5.   
Intersection and Capacity Clearance Time with 
Foothill Capacity=5
Clearance Time with 
Foothill Capacity=10 
Tunnel33 capacity=0 41:10 41:10
Tunnel 33 capacity=1 30:10 30:10
Tunnel 33 capacity=2 22:30 22:30
Tunnel 33 capacity=3 18:50 18:50
Tunnel 33 capacity=4 18:50 18:50
Tunnel 33 capacity=5 (Baseline value) 18:50 18:50
Tunnel 33 capacity=6 18:50 18:50
Tunnel 33 capacity=10 18:50 18:50
Tunnel24 capacity=0 40:30 40:30
Tunnel24 capacity=1 30:00 30:00
Tunnel24 capacity=2 22:30 22:30
Tunnel24 capacity=3 (Baseline value) 18:50 18:50
Tunnel24 capacity=4 18:50 18:50
Tunnel24 capacity=5 18:50 18:50
Tunnel24 capacity=6 18:50 18:50
all lower Tunnel capacity=5 18:50 18:50
all lower Tunnel capacity=6 18:50 18:50
all lower Tunnel capacity=7 18:50 18:50
all lower Tunnel capacity=8 18:50 18:50
all lower Tunnel capacity=10 18:50 18:50  
Table 4.   Impact of Tunnel Road capacities on clearance times. One car per 
driveway with staggered departure times.  Increasing capacity of Tunnel Road and 
Foothill Road does not improve evacuation clearing times. 
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Intersection and Capacity Clearance Time with 
Foothill Flow=5
Clearance Time with 
Foothill Flow=10
Tunnel33 capacity=0 1:18:10 1:18:10
Tunnel 33 capacity=1 55:20 55:20
Tunnel 33 capacity=2 40:50 40:50
Tunnel 33 capacity=3 33:20 33:20
Tunnel 33 capacity=4 33:10 33:10
Tunnel 33 capacity=5 (Baseline value) 33:10 33:10
Tunnel 33 capacity=6 33:10 33:10
Tunnel 33 capacity=10 33:10 33:10
Tunnel24 capacity=0 1:17:00 1:17:00
Tunnel24 capacity=1 54:50 54:50
Tunnel24 capacity=2 40:40 40:40
Tunnel24 capacity=3 (Baseline value) 33:10 33:10
Tunnel24 capacity=4 33:10 28:10
Tunnel24 capacity=5 33:10 26:40
Tunnel24 capacity=6 33:10 26:40
all lower Tunnel capacity=5 33:10 26:40
all lower Tunnel capacity=6 33:10 26:30
all lower Tunnel capacity=7 33:10 26:40
all lower Tunnel capacity=8 33:10 26:40
all lower Tunnel capacity=10 33:10 26:30  
Table 5.   Impact of Tunnel Road capacities on clearance times. Two cars per 
driveway with staggered departure times.  Increasing capacity of Tunnel Road and 
Foothill Road improves evacuation clearance times. 
2. Impact of Road Closures 
We now consider the role of 21 “critical intersections” (Church, 2010) for the 
Mission Canyon neighborhood.  We first look at what happens to the evacuation times if 
an intersection is completely blocked.  Such a scenario could arise due to a natural 
calamity (e.g., a tree falling or reduced visibility, causing an accident that blocks the 
road) or due to the actions of an intelligent adversary (e.g., a person intentionally 
obstructs an intersection with a large vehicle).  Of the 21 intersections, we find that eight 
of them, if blocked individually, would completely isolate some houses.  The most severe 
of these is the Montrose and Tunnel intersection, which connects the entire upper region 
 30
of Mission Canyon, 95 homes in total.  In addition to isolating 95 homes, a closure of this 
intersection increases the overall time to evacuate the rest of the neighborhood (assuming 
2 cars per driveway) by 27:30.  The loss of the intersection at Montrose and Williams 
would also be disastrous for evacuation times.  Losing this intersection isolates 14 homes 
from the evacuation network and increases the time to evacuate the remaining 
neighborhood (assuming two cars per driveway) by 25:20.  As previously mentioned, a 
loss of the intersection at Tunnel and Foothill (Tunnel 33) increases evacuation time by 
45:00, although it does not isolate any homes. 
Losing the intersection of Palomino and Williams isolates 51 homes, but results in 
an improvement in evacuation time for the remaining homes relative to our baseline 
model (3:50 faster).  Assuming two cars per driveway, this closure removes 102 cars 
from the system, and this explains why we see an improvement in evacuation time.  
Similar results hold for the intersection of Ben Lomond and Kenmore; 47 homes are 
isolated, but evacuation time for the remaining neighborhood is improved by 2:50.  
Losing the intersection of Kenmore and Arriba isolates 31 homes and results in an 
improved evacuation time for the remaining neighborhood of 2:00. 
Table 6 summarizes the impact of these and other intersection closures on the 
number of isolated houses and the total clearing times.  Intersections whose losses would 
isolate houses are natural candidates for traffic control or other “protection measures.”  




Houses isolated if 
intersection is "closed"
clearing time for 
remaining houses 
(periods)
∆t (minutes) Clearing time if intersection arc capacity=1 (periods) ∆t (minutes)
1. Ben01 - 199 - 199 -
2. Ben06 47 182 -2:50 199 -
3. Chel01 - 199 - 199 -
4. Chel03 - 199 - 199 -
5. Chel06 - 294 15:50 229 5:00
6. Chel12 - 310 18:30 241 7:00
7. Chel13 10 213 2:20 199 -
8. Chel16 - 224 4:10 199 -
9. Chel17 - 199 - 199 -
10. Chel18 - 221 3:40 199 -
11. Chel23 21 199 - 199 -
12. Chel24 - 210 1:50 199 -
13. Ex02 21 210 1:50 199 -
14. Foo01 - 469 45:00 332 22:10
15. Gle07 * - 307 18:00 258 9:50
16. Ken04 31 187 -2:00 199 -
17. Montrose01 14 351 25:20 254 9:10
18. Palomino16 51 176 -3:50 199 -
19. Tunnel24 95 364 27:30 329 21:40
20. Tye01 - 204 0:50 199 -
21. Williams03 - 278 13:10 200 0:10
* (closing isolates Foo15 sink)
2 Car staggered network- variation results
 
Table 6.   Effects of intersection closures or restrictions on the evacuation of Mission 
Canyon. 
3. Impact of Severely Limiting Intersection Flow 
We also consider the impact of severely limiting the throughput capacity at these 
21 critical intersections.  We assess this by reducing in isolation each intersection 
capacity to one vehicle per time period (360/hour).  Doing so, we find that a number of 
these intersections are not critical, provided that they have minimal throughput capacity.  
In fact, six of the eight intersections that isolate homes when blocked have no impact on 
clearing times provided they have minimal throughput capacity.  The intersection of 
Cheltenham and Kenmore increases overall evacuation time by 5:00, while restricting the 
throughput of Cheltenham and Exeter increases evacuation time by 7:00.  Restricting the 
throughput of Glen Albyn and Foothill increases evacuation time by 9:50, because this 
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intersection is a direct input to one of our two sink nodes.  Restricting the throughput of 
Montrose and Williams increases evacuation times by 9:10. 
 
Intersections whose closure 
results in evacuation delays
Intersections whose closure 






















Figure 13.   A network representation of Mission Canyon with critical intersections shaded 
in light grey.  Those intersections whose closures result in the isolation of 
houses from the evacuation network are shaded in dark grey.  The numbers 
correspond to the intersections listed in Table 6. 
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Restricting the throughput of Tunnel road at either the Tunnel and Montrose 
intersection or the Tunnel and Foothill intersection has the largest impact of any of the 21 
intersections.  For the intersection of Montrose and Tunnel, restricting capacity increases 
the evacuation time by 21:40, while doing so at Tunnel and Foothill increases evacuation 
time by 22:10.  We believe these results further justify the need to ensure this portion of 
Tunnel Road is either fortified against disruptions or has traffic control enacted during an 
evacuation event.  We present full results for the closure or restriction of critical 
intersections in Table 6.   
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We develop two network flow models to quantify the clearing times of 
neighborhood evacuations.  Our first model is a spatial model that finds minimum-cost 
evacuation routes.  We represent the Mission Canyon neighborhood as a network 
consisting of supply (e.g., homes), transshipment nodes (e.g., intersections), and 
connecting arcs (e.g., road segments), all of which are connect to a “super-sink” egress 
point.  From this spatial model, we create a space-time model by replicating the spatial 
network for each of T time periods, and we solve for best-case evacuation flows in space 
and time. 
We first develop a baseline evacuation scenario of Mission Canyon and compare 
it to the previous analysis of Church and Sexton (2002).  We find that our model 
produces similar evacuation clearance time estimates as those obtained by the more time-
intensive micro-simulations.  With this baseline established, we exercise the model to 
assess the effects that various changes to our model inputs or network design have on 
neighborhood evacuation time.  Because our model is simple and solves quickly, we are 
able to consider several scenarios. 
We find that staggering departure times does not result in an appreciably longer 
clearing time than an evacuation with simultaneous departures.  We conclude that the 
presence of background traffic flow on Foothill Road does not greatly impact the 
neighborhood evacuation, but rather that the overall evacuation time is more largely 
impacted by the interior roads of the neighborhood.  We estimate that losing access to the 
lower Tunnel Road would more than double the time to evacuate the neighborhood for 
both a one- and two-car-per-household scenario.  This crippling effect results when an 
intersection node at either end of this road segment is blocked, and we argue that efforts 
should be taken to ensure this road is fortified against possible closure due to natural or 
deliberate attacks. 
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We ran analyses on our network to determine the effects on evacuation time if any 
of 21 “critical intersections” are either isolated from the network or have their throughput 
capacity severely limited.  Of the 21 intersections, we find that eight of them would 
isolate some number of houses from the network if we completely disconnect them.  
Similarly, we find that complete isolation of 13 of the 21 intersections result in longer 
evacuations.  The least severe of these increases evacuation time by 50 seconds, while the 
most severe closure increases clearing time by 45 minutes. 
We examine the results on neighborhood clearing time if each of these same 21 
intersections have their throughput capacity limited to one vehicle per time period (360 
per hour).  These analyses show that 14 of the 21 intersections would have no impact on 
overall clearance times if restricted.  For the other seven, the least severe delay was 0:10, 
while the most severe increased evacuation times by 22:10. 
We recognize there is further work that will improve upon our model and make it 
more user-friendly and easier to deploy to various neighborhoods. 
B. FUTURE WORK   
1. Adding Additional Egress Points (Arcs or Sinks) 
The micro-simulation work of Church and Sexton (2002) considers additional 
evacuation scenarios that we do not address here.  Specifically, they consider how 
evacuation time changes if an alternate route out of the neighborhood becomes available.  
We can easily modify our model to experiment with alternate exit routes.  Additionally, 
we can change our model to allow for an additional egress point from the neighborhood 
to the “super sink” and estimate evacuation times under this excursion. 
2. Input of Data 
In developing our model, we focus solely on the Mission Canyon neighborhood 
and we utilize a simplistic method of network mapping, Google Earth.  This method is 
effective, but manually intensive and tedious.  We believe that an automated interface 
with Google Earth or other Geographical Information Systems (GIS) could drastically 
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improve the total time necessary to model a neighborhood.  By reducing the time to build 
the spatial network, our model becomes more quickly deployable in the event of an 
emergent evacuation. 
3. Attacking the Network   
By changing the capacity of arcs in model SPACETIME, we can assess the 
impact of any change in the road network on the evacuation times.  In this thesis, we 
consider only a handful of scenarios.  A more thorough approach would be to search over 
all sets of possible road or intersection closures to identify the worst-case disruptions.  
Specifically, we expect that the application of attacker-defender models (e.g., Brown et 
al., 2006) to these evacuation problems would reveal insights about the vulnerability of 
evacuation to the intentional actions of an intelligent adversary who wishes to increase 
the neighborhood clearing times. 
By extension, we foresee the use of defender-attacker-defender models (Brown et 
al., 2006) to protect the neighborhood against long evacuation times.  First, it provides 
insight into those areas of the network that should be fortified or somehow controlled to 
minimize the potential for traffic disruption due to the acts of an intelligent adversary 
(e.g., terrorist) or natural calamity (e.g., intersection wash out due to a mudslide).   
In addition, there is potential for beneficial disruption of traffic flow for short 
periods of time.  A specific example pertinent to our model is the upper region of the 
Mission Canyon neighborhood and the junction with the middle region of the 
neighborhood.  The Montrose and Tunnel intersection (Tunnel24) is one of the most 
critical in our model based on its effect on clearing times, and houses isolated if we 
disconnect the arc.  However, our model also indicates that the upper region of the 
neighborhood will likely clear slower than possible because of road congestion on Tunnel 
due to the evacuating traffic of middle Mission Canyon.  Because upper Mission Canyon 
is bordered on three sides by chaparral, it is foreseeable that it would be the area of the 
neighborhood that would most quickly need to be evacuated due to a forest fire.  We 
maintain that temporarily blocking the road that connects traffic from middle Mission 
Canyon to Tunnel Road would prove beneficial in the evacuation.  By temporarily 
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blocking traffic from middle Mission Canyon, we believe we can achieve a quicker 
evacuation of the upper Mission Canyon neighborhood while not greatly impacting the 
overall evacuation time for the entire network.  Developing the ability of our model to 
allow for such temporary disruptions will provide concrete data to support or disprove the 
notion that we can evacuate the most at-risk area of the neighborhood more quickly 
without a large impact on overall evacuation time by “shutting off” the arc for a short 
time. 
4. Visualization of Results 
We use Microsoft Excel to assist us in visualizing the flow of traffic during our 
evacuation of Mission Canyon.  While this technique is incredibly helpful in seeing how 
the evacuation takes place, it is not yet in a format that can be easily adapted to show 
results for different neighborhoods.  Without a visualization tool, the immense amount of 
data generated during our optimization is incredibly difficult to analyze, and certainly 
cannot be done quickly.  Developing an output format, or a program interface that allows 
us to automatically translate the data into something we can visualize without requiring a 
large amount of up-front manipulation, will greatly improve the speed at which we can 
present useful information to decision makers in the event of a short- or no-notice 
evacuation. 
5. Vehicle Tracking 
Another natural next step is to develop the ability to tag and track individual 
vehicles throughout the evacuation optimization.  Incorporating this with our improved 
output interface would allow us to show iteratively the routes that each individual house 
in a neighborhood should take during the “optimum” evacuation.  With this knowledge, 
and applying our model to a neighborhood before an evacuation is necessary, we can 
provide each resident with detailed information about possible routes they should follow 
to ensure that they and the entire neighborhood evacuate as quickly as possible.  Such 
information could be delivered to residents using the “reverse 911” system currently in 
place or via other social networking technologies (e.g., Twitter).  While we cannot ensure 
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that individuals will comply with the routes presented, there is benefit in providing them 
the information so they have something they can rely on. 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Over the last few decades, there has been a trend that people migrate toward areas 
that are disaster prone (e.g., coastal areas, urban wildland interface areas).  This suggests 
that evacuations will become increasingly common as more people inhabit these areas.  
As such, understanding when to order an evacuation, how long to allow for an 
evacuation, and how to route individuals in an evacuation will be important for public 
safety officials, and often with short notice.  We offer our space-time model for 
optimized network flow evacuation as one of many tools that emergency planners can use 
in answering these questions, and we provide the Mission Canyon neighborhood analysis 
as an example of the insights that can be obtained. 
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